When considering how to narrow the funding gap facing Social Security, policy makers continue to consider the option of raising the maximum salary subject to the payroll tax (U.S.
Senate, Special Committee on Aging, 2010) . In this paper we attempt to improve our understanding of how changes in the maximum level of earnings subject to the payroll tax have affected Social Security taxes and benefits. We use data from the Health and Retirement Study to separate the changes in taxes and benefits resulting from changes in the cap on income subject to payroll taxes from the effects of other complex changes that have occurred contemporaneously with the rise in the cap. Our strategy is to ask what benefits and taxes would have been for members of the HRS cohort ages 51 to 56 in 2004 if they faced the same maximum income subject to the payroll tax that applied to members of cohorts who were 12 and 24 years older.
An increase in maximum covered earnings has an immediate effect on payroll tax revenues. But unlike an across the board increase in the payroll tax rate, an increase in maximum covered earnings restricts the tax increase to those with highest earnings. It has no effect on many workers, raising tax costs only for those with earnings at or above the new effective cap.
In addition, as opposed to an increase in the payroll tax rate, raising the tax ceiling creates a leak in the (future) finances of the system in the form of an increase in future obligations to be paid to those at the top of the earnings distribution. Those who have earnings above the old cap have more of their total lifetime earnings covered by Social Security when the cap is increased. As a result, they are entitled to higher benefits. Although one could increase the cap on covered earnings without raising Social Security benefits, some are loathe to do this because it violates the insurance principle underlying Social Security. In keeping with the redistributive motivation of Social Security, for those at the cap benefits rise by only 15 percent of the increase in covered earnings. Thus the rate of increase in maximum taxable earnings has been about twice the rate of increase of average earnings 3 We use these data to study how increases in maximum taxable earnings have affected the benefits of members of this cohort relative to members of cohorts that are 12 and 24 years older. We estimate how the benefits of the younger cohort would have changed had they faced the lower ceiling on taxable earnings that faced members of the original HRS cohort, who are 12 years older, and the ceiling for the CODA (Children of the Depression) cohort, who are 12 years older than that. 4 2 There is a small element of simultaneity here as part of the increase in average covered earnings is the result of the increase in the earnings cap.
In making our calculations, all we change is the ceiling on earnings subject the payroll tax that was in place when the person was of a particular age. Otherwise we risk confounding our findings with the effects of other contemporaneous changes that have also 3 The HRS survey was in the field as of the writing of this paper. It is now collecting data for a new cohort, the Mid Boomers, who are ages 51 to 56 in 2010. 4 In calculating benefits we hold earnings history constant at the level observed for the Early Boomer cohort, and use the benefit formula in place in 2004. Benefits for the Early Boomer cohort are based on Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME), computed from covered earnings, increased by a wage index up to the year the individual turns age 60. The AIME is averaged over the highest 35 years of covered, indexed earnings. Earnings after age 60 will enter into the AIME calculation if they exceed indexed earnings in the lowest of the 35 years previously counted toward the AIME. From Average Indexed Covered (Monthly) Earnings, the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) is calculated. For a person turning age 60 in 2004, the PIA replaced 90 percent of the first $612 in monthly earnings, 32 percent of the next $3,077, and 15 percent of the amount above $3,689. This same formula is applied to the same earnings history for each member of the HRS cohort, but the level of maximum covered earnings is changed when the simulation pertains to those born 12 and 24 years earlier.
affected benefits. For example, members of the Early Boomer cohort had a higher normal retirement age than did members of the HRS cohort. At least in this respect, the benefit formula applicable to the HRS cohort was more generous than the benefit formula for Early Boomers.
Our analysis utilizes Social Security earnings records for those HRS respondents who gave explicit permission to allow their earnings records to be matched to the basic survey instrument, while imputing benefits for those without a matched earnings record.
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To determine how changes in the earnings cap have affected the distribution of benefits, and in particular how these changes have affected those in the top of the earnings distribution,
Social
Security benefits are calculated from data on yearly covered earnings using the Social Security Administration's ANYPIA program. In analyzing the effect of changes in the Social Security earnings cap, we ask how benefits would have changed (for the cohort of Early Boomers, those ages 51 to 56 in 2004) if the maximum taxable earnings that applied to the HRS cohort of 51 to 56 year olds instead had applied to the Early Boomer cohort. To simulate the effects of a lower ceiling on covered earnings for members of older cohorts, while holding all other factors constant, we artificially truncate the level of (real) earnings inserted into the ANYPIA program by the earnings cap that applied 12 or 24 years earlier, adjusting for differences in average earnings over the period. Using this methodology, we simulate the effects of the increase in the payroll tax ceiling as experienced between the cohorts aged 51 to 56 in 2004 and in 1992 and between those 51 to 56 in 2004 vs.1980. 5 In the past two years, Social Security benefits have provided an important buffer to the decline in the stock market. In part because of the dominating presence of Social Security, the recent decline in the stock market reduced total retirement wealth by about 5 percentage points for the population approaching retirement age (Gustman, Steinmeier and Tabatabai, 2010) . The cushion provided by Social Security is especially important for those in the lower half of the income and wealth distributions, the usual targets of social policy. But those in the lower half of the earnings distribution are largely unaffected by the increase in the ceiling on taxable earnings.
we examine the changes in benefits for those falling in different earnings quartiles, focusing a good deal of our attention on those falling in the highest earnings quartile.
Section II of the paper discusses the cap on earnings subject to the payroll tax and describes more fully how that cap has changed over time. Section III uses HRS data for the Early Boomer cohort to summarize changes in monthly Social Security benefits due to the change in the maximum level of covered earnings between the Early Boomer cohort and those in a cohort 12 years older, and then compared to a cohort 24 years older. In Section IV we examine the effects on both benefits and taxes of increases in the ceiling on taxable earnings for those with earnings at or above the earnings cap throughout their lifetimes. Section V uses HRS data to investigate the effects of changes in the earnings cap on the present values of benefits and taxes over the lifetime of members of the Early Boomer cohort, while Section VI discusses the implications of our findings.
II. Maximum taxable earnings subject to the payroll tax
From 1937 to 1949, annual maximum earnings subject to the payroll tax was $3,000.
Once the real value of the $3,000 cap was eroded by rising earnings, the share of total earnings covered by Social Security began to decline, and continued down for decades. A reversal in policy was implemented in the mid 1970s and the cap climbed relative to average earnings, before stabilizing in the 1980s.
Suppose we are dealing with a member of the original HRS cohort who was 56 in 1992 and who worked on a long term job until age 60 in 1996. For simplicity, this individual's yearly earnings always increased over his lifetime, and earnings from 1961 are the lowest of his annual earnings counted when computing AIME (Average Indexed Monthly Earnings). In 1961, the cap on yearly earnings subject to the payroll tax was $4,800, about 17 percent greater than average annual earnings in private employment for that year. Roughly speaking, any earnings above average earnings were not subject to the payroll tax and would not generate future benefits. Now consider a person who was 56 in 2004, leaving a long term job in 2008 at age 60, with earnings from 1973 the lowest earnings counting toward AIME. In 1973, earnings up to $10,800 were covered by Social Security and subject to a payroll tax. Since earnings in the private sector averaged about $7,580, earnings up to 42 percent above the average level were taxed and generated benefits. Of course, many of those with relatively low earnings were not affected by the increase in maximum covered earnings, but many with moderate or high earnings found their AIME increased by the application of a higher ceiling.
Any change in the earnings cap over time should be adjusted for changes in average earnings over time. To make that adjustment, we use the calculated wage growth used to index for earnings growth in the AIME calculation. Members of the Early Boomer cohort, born from As noted above, the cap on covered earnings does have an effect on average covered earnings. When the cap is increased, that raises average earnings. Thus the simple adjustment for indexing used here overstates the adjustment that should be applied to the cap in earnings from the earlier year. Of course, most of the increase in average earnings is due to the increase in wages observed as a result of productivity growth, changes in the underlying wage structure and inflation, with modification due to the changing mix in employment in favor of more women, whose wages still fall below those of men. to the average wage ranges from 1.09 to 1.29. Removing the period from 1986 to 1998, the last years counted in determining the AIME for member of the HRS cohort, eliminates a 12 year period where the ratio of the cap on covered earnings ranged from 2.33 to 2.55. Having considered how maximum taxable earnings related to average earnings, consider how the fraction of workers whose total earnings were above and below the annual taxable maximum has changed over time. Table 2 reports the share of the population with earnings below the taxable earnings cap. In 1937, 96.9 percent of workers had earnings below the cap, so that only 3.1 percent of workers had earnings above the cap. After rising, and reaching a third of workers in the 1960s, the fraction with earnings above the cap began to fall. By 1979, only 10 percent of earners had earnings above the cap. In the following years the cap rose to the point where only 5 or 6 percent of workers had earnings above the cap. From these data, we also see that male workers are more likely than female workers to have earnings above the cap. 
III. Measuring the Effects on Monthly Benefits of Changes in the Social Security Earnings Cap
To isolate the effects on benefits of changes in the cap on earnings subject to the Social Security payroll tax, the most straight-forward approach is to begin with a single cohort. We From Table 3 , row 1, columns 1 and 5, Average Indexed Monthly Earnings are increased by about 3.7 percent (2825/2724) when the payroll tax cap that applied to the Early Boomer cohort is used instead of the cap that applied to the HRS cohort, whose members were 12 years older. Given the progressivity of the benefit formula, the primary insurance amount is only 1.6 (1432/1410) percent greater when the cap from 2004 (row 1, column 2) is used instead of the adjusted cap that applied to the 1992 cohort (row 1, column 6). For men, the difference in AIME is 5.6 percent (3378/3200), wider than the difference for women of 1.7 percent (2372/2333). As expected, women are much less likely to have earnings near the cap, and thus are much less likely to be affected by an increase in the cap. The corresponding effects on benefits of raising the earnings cap between the HRS and Early Boomer cohorts are 2.4 percent (1606/1568) for men, and 0.7 percent (1289/1280) for women.
The nearest neighbor is then selected on the basis of the predicted PIA, including in the sample both those with and without matched earnings records. We then replace the missing record with the entire Social Security record of the donor and treat the observation for which a value was imputed as if the earnings record had never been missing. 8 Covariates used in imputing earnings records are taken from respondent reports to the HRS. They include annual earnings from current job, household income from last calendar year, demographic characteristics, indicators of marital status and history, age, work history, including reported work in each HRS wave, tenure on longest and current job, total number of years worked, number of jobs, number of jobs worked five or more years, industry and occupation from current job, union membership, whether public employee, if U.S. born, home ownership, number of children, if the individual is insured for benefits at normal retirement age, labor force and disability status, self employment status in 2004, and veteran's status.
The last two columns of Table 3 make the analogous calculations regarding the increase in the real earnings cap over 24 years, essentially comparing the effects of the real caps in place for members of the Early Boomer cohort, 51 to 56 in 2004, with the real caps for members of the Children of the Depression (CODA) cohort, 51 to 56 in 1980. Over the entire population, the difference in benefits generated by raising the maximum level of earnings subject to the payroll tax is a much more substantial 3.8 (1432/1380) percent. For men, there is a 5.4 percent (1606/1524) increase in benefits from raising the earnings cap between the Early Boomer and CODA cohorts. For women, the difference is 2.2 percent (1289/1261). Table 4 presents the analogous results after sorting the population by AIME quartile.
Tables 5 and 6 present the same results by AIME quartile separately for men and women. .
We focus on columns 7 and 9 of each of these tables. From the first row of Table 4 , columns 7 and 9, for those in the bottom quartile of the AIME distribution, there is no effect on the Primary Insurance Amount from raising the cap between the HRS and either the Early Boomer or Children of the Depression cohorts. Benefits are increased by 0 and 1 percent for those in the second quartile, and 1 and 2 percent for those in the third quartile. As expected, there are much larger effects from changing the caps for those in the fourth AIME quartile, bottom row of Table 4 . If those in the upper quartile of the AIME distribution in 2004 were subject to the real caps imposed on those 12 years older, their primary insurance amount would be roughly 3 percent lower. Imposing the real cap on earnings that would have obtained for a cohort 51 to 56 in 1980 increases the benefits of those in the fourth AIME quartile by 8 percent.
Comparing Tables 5 
IV. Effects of Changes in Maximum Earnings Subject to the Payroll Tax on Taxes and
Benefits for Those Whose Earnings Are at or Above the Maximum.
Next we would like to see how past increases in maximum earnings subject to the payroll tax affected the present values of both tax and benefit streams for those with maximum earnings. The first thing to notice in Table 7 is how poor a deal Social Security is for a person with earnings at or above the cap. The present value of the basic benefit in 2004 is $226,462, while the present value of taxes paid is $521,581. As we know, the benefit formula is designed to redistribute benefits among those with different levels of earnings. The replacement rates specified by the formula determining Social Security benefits in 2004 decline from 90 percent of the first $7,344 of annual earnings, to 32 percent of the next $36,924, down to 15 percent of any remaining earnings through the covered maximum. Nevertheless, the relation between benefits and taxes is better than indicated in the table. There are two reasons for this. First, the deal faced by our representative individual would be greatly improved by counting spouse and survivor benefits, which are more important for those with higher earnings (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2001 ). Second, as noted previously, the tax rate we use includes taxes to support disability insurance, but we do not count disability benefits in our benefit calculation.
Nevertheless, increasing the earnings cap does raise benefits and taxes. The remainder of the data in Table 7 tells us just how much benefits and taxes were increased for this high earner as the ceiling on covered earnings was raised to the level that applied to a person born in 1948 from a person born in 1936, 12 years earlier, and then to a person born in 1924, 24 years earlier.
After adjusting the cap in real terms, from columns 1 and 3, the present value of benefits increase due to the increase in the payroll tax cap over the 12 years from $207,301 to $226,462, or 9.2 percent. The present value of payroll taxes paid increase much more, from $412,054 to $521,581, or by 26.6 percent. Comparing columns 1 and 5, which report comparable figures over 24 years, the present value of benefits increase due to the increase in the cap on earnings subject to the payroll tax from $198,340 to $226,462, or 14.2 percent. The present value of payroll taxes paid increase from $385,638 to $521,581, or by 35.2 percent.
A number of interest for policy is the leakage in benefits created by the increase in the payroll tax cap. This number indicates the share of the tax increase that is used to support higher benefits. Comparing first the Early Boomer and HRS cohorts, the change in the present value of benefits divided by the change in the present value of taxes from raising the ceiling on the payroll tax amounts to about 17 percent, as reported in column 7 of Table 7 . Between the CODA and Early Boomer cohorts, from the last column in the table, the change in the present value of benefits divided by the change in the present value of taxes from raising the ceiling on the payroll tax, after adjusting the change in the caps for changes in the wage, amounts to about 21 percent.
Thus our example suggests that for a person earning at the maximum level covered by
Social Security, about a fifth of the additional taxes collected due to the increase in the earnings cap are used to pay for increased benefits, reducing the incremental funds available for addressing the Social Security revenue shortfall by about a fifth. When we use HRS data, the share of increased taxes that leaks back in the form of additional benefits will be slightly higher. 
V. Effects of Changes in Maximum Earnings Subject to the Payroll Tax on Benefits and Taxes for the Early Boomer Cohort
Now we turn to the data from the HRS and apply those data as we did in Section III, here accounting for the effects of changes in the ceiling on covered earnings on both benefits and taxes. Our baseline is the Early Boomer cohort. In examining the effect of changes in the ceiling on taxable earnings, we once again ask how benefits and taxes would change if we change only the maximum earnings subject to the payroll tax, holding earnings and other aspects of the tax and benefit rules, such as the payroll tax rate, constant between the Early Boomer cohort and older cohorts.
10 Table 8 follows the format of the tables in the previous section. Comparing the effects of the earnings caps that applied to the Early Boomer cohort and the HRS cohort 12 years older, we see from columns 1 and 3 that the present value of benefits is increased by 1.5 percent (120,991/119,190) due to the higher cap applying to the members of the early boomer cohort.
Taxes are increased by 5.3 percent (162,692/154,570) . So the increase in benefits from the higher cap on covered payroll amounts to 22 percent of the increase in taxes, (120,991 -119,190)/(162,692 -154,570) .
10 Once again, we apply a tax rate that includes the portion used to support DI benefits, while not adding disability payments to the benefit side. One might try to adjust benefits by simply eliminating those who receive DI benefits from the sample. This would require a deeper analysis of DI benefit determination than we undertake here. For one thing, the sample includes those ages 51 to 56. A number of these individuals will become eligible for disability benefits before they reach normal retirement age, but without a full model of disability determination, we cannot identify which ones they are. For another, once they become eligible for normal retirement benefits, the disability case is converted from the disability roles to the Social Security roles. The Appendix contains four tables that decompose the benefit and tax changes first between men and women (Table 9) , then by quartile (Table 10 ). As expected, these tables show that the changes in benefits and taxes were concentrated, but not exclusively located, in the top quartiles, and were much larger for men than for women. Tables 11 and 12, further disaggregate the results, focusing on the distributions within quartiles of men and women, and the changes in benefits and taxes within quartile, by gender.
There are two basic findings from these results. First, as expected, most of the increases in taxes and benefits are concentrated in the men who fall in the top quartile of earners. As seen in Table 11 , bottom row, their taxes are increased by 12.6 percent (406,893/361,456) over the taxes of those in a cohort 12 years older, and by 26.4 percent (406,896/321,863) relative to the taxes of those who are 24 years older. The comparable increases for their benefits, shown in row 7, are 3.9 percent (196,633/189,273) and 10.2 percent (196,633/178,393) . Overall, the ratio of the increase in benefits to the increase in taxes for men falling in the top quartile of earners is 16 percent and 21 percent compared to those in cohorts 12 and 24 years older.
Increases in the ceiling on covered earnings also affects the taxes and benefits of men in the third quartile, but the effect is much smaller than it is for members of the top quartile of earners. For example, for men in the fourth quartile, taxes increase by almost $90,000 due to the increase in the payroll tax ceiling, while for members of the third quartile, taxes increase by only $13,000.
Similarly, benefits and taxes reported in Table 12 are seen to be increased for women in the top quartile of female earners as a result of the increase in the ceiling on earnings covered by the payroll tax. But the taxes paid by women in the top quartile increase by only $27,000 (278,876 -251,896 ) as a result of the increase in the payroll tax ceiling over 24 years.
VI. Conclusions:
This paper has analyzed how changes in the level of maximum earnings subject to the Social Security payroll tax have affected Social Security benefits and taxes paid. There are two important differences between the effect of raising a given amount of tax dollars by increasing the payroll tax rate, as compared to increasing the maximum earnings subject to the payroll tax. First, because increasing the maximum income subject to the payroll tax increases both tax revenues and benefit payments, an increase in the ceiling on income subject to the payroll tax that generates the same addition to taxes as does an increase in the payroll tax rate, nevertheless generates less net revenue. Second, since both the tax increase and benefit increase from raising the ceiling on earnings subject to the payroll tax applies only to those in the top income brackets, distributional differences result in both tax payments by income group and benefit receipt by income group. In particular, only high earners receive a benefit increase. *Ratios of differences only reported when both tax and benefit changes exceed $1,000. *Ratios of differences only reported when both tax and benefit change exceed $1,000.
